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Note
More Harm Than Good: Assessing Federalization of
Criminal Law
Stephen Chippendale
Federalization' of criminal law under the Commerce
Clause2 has contributed to an explosive growth in federal law
enforcement. 3 The federal criminal code currently includes
1. The term "federalization," broadly defined, describes the growth of federal law at the expense of the states. Edward L. Rubin, Uniformity, Regulation,
and the Federalizationof State Law: Some Lessons from the Payment System,
49 OHio ST. L.J. 1251, 1251-52 (1989) (distinguishing "federalization" and "nationalization"). In the criminal-law context, and for the purposes of this Note,
federalization refers to the creation of federal offenses for criminal acts amenable to state and local prosecution. Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of State and
Federal Civil Rights Prosecutions: The Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41
UCLA L. REv. 509, 512 n.9 (1994).
2. The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have Power... To
regulate Commerce ... among the Several States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
The Commerce Clause was adopted to give the federal government power to
prevent state tariff barriers. David S. Bogen, The Hunting of the Shark: An
Inquiry into the Limits of CongressionalPower Under The Commerce Clause, 8
WAxE FoREsT L. REv. 187, 192 (1972).
The contours of the Clause have evolved through judicial interpretation. In
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824), Chief Justice John Marshall
broadly defined "commerce among the States" as "commerce which concerns
more States than one." From 1887 to 1937, however, the Court rejected the
expansive view suggested in Gibbons in favor of a narrower view of the commerce power. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276-77 (1918)
(holding that the commerce power does not authorize the prohibition of interstate transit of goods produced by child labor). The Court acceded to political
pressure in 1937 and reversed its narrow interpretation of the commerce power
in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41-43 (1937). For a detailed account of the Court during this doctrinal transformation, see EDwARD S.
CoRwIN, CONSTrrUTIONAL REvOLUTIoN, LTD. 39-79 (1941).
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause has become virtually
limitless since the New Deal. See infra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the current broad scope of the commerce power).
3. See James M. Maloney, Note, Shooting for an Omnipotent Congress:
The Constitutionalityof Federal Regulation of Intrastate FirearmsPossession,
62 FoRDHAmI L. REV. 1795, 1796 (1994) (noting that "the Commerce Clause has
become, in recent years, the foundation for an expanding federal criminal jurisdiction over intrastate activities") (footnote omitted).
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more than 3,000 offenses 4 and "hardly a congressional session
goes by without an attempt to add new sections."5 These additions caused federal criminal case filings to increase nearly seventy percent between 1980 and 1990.6 Criminal cases now
consume half of the federal judiciary's total time, 7 and criminal
trials account for eighty percent of the caseload in some
districts.8

To appreciate this accelerating growth of federal law enforcement it is necessary to recall how limited the federal government's role in controlling crime has historically been under
American federalism.9 The Constitution expressly grants Congress the authority to punish only four types of criminal conduct.10 Similarly, the federal court system reflects the Framers'
4. W. John Moore, The High Price of Good Intentions, 25 NATL J. 1140,
1140 (1993).
5. William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Futureof the Federal Courts, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 1, 7.
6. Mary Wisniewski, Judicial Panel Opposes Criminal Bill Provision,
Cm. DAILY L. BULL., July 16, 1991, at 1. Federal drug prosecutions tripled in
the decade after 1982. Paul M. Barrett, Clinton Wants to Broaden Federal
FightAgainst Crime, but Strategy has Critics, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 12, 1993, at
10A.
7. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Remarks at a United States Sentencing Commission Symposium on "Drugs and Violence in America" (June 18,
1993), in REUTER TRANsCRIPT REP. (June 18, 1993) (availablein LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Wires File).
8. Id. Drug cases alone account for 40% of all federal cases that go to
trial. W. John Moore, CourtingDisaster,22 NATL J. 502, 504 (1990).
9. "As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution establishes a system of
dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government." Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2399 (1991). Justice Hugo Black described the relationship between the national government and the states as "Our Federalism."
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). For a history of American federalism, see 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 697-708 (Leonard W.
Levy et al. eds., 1986); John M. Wisdom, The Ever-WhirlingWheels ofAmerican
Federalism, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1063, 1063-78 (1984).
Congressional legislation must be based on a grant of power enumerated in
the Constitution. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405
(1819); see also Robert E. Cushman, The NationalPolicePower Under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,3 MINN. L. REV. 289, 290-301 (1919) (explaining that the doctrine of enumerated powers is a constitutional axiom). In
contrast to the federal government's limited powers, the powers given to the
states are not enumerated. U.S. CONsT. amend. X ('The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
10. The Constitution authorizes Congress to punish counterfeiting, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6, piracy on the high seas, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10,
crimes committed on federal property, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 17, and treason, U.S. CONsT. art. IIH, § 3.
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desire to protect state authority over criminal prosecution.:"
Consequently, states have traditionally 12
been responsible for defining and punishing criminal offenses.
This Note explores the proliferation of federal statutes
targeting intrastate crime. Part I discusses the growth of federal criminal law and the emerging backlash to that growth.
Part II analyzes the federalization trend and concludes that federalization unsettles the proper jurisdictional balance between
James Madison expected the federal government to have a restricted role
in law enforcement:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State
governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and
foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the
most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States
will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs,
concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Arlington House 1966).
11. The Judiciary Act of 1789 established only limited federal jurisdiction.
See Richard J. Richardson & Kenneth N. Vines, The Politics of Federal Court
Development, in CouRTs IN AMERICAN POLITICs 21, 23 (Henry R. Glick ed.,
1990). Some commentators conclude that the Eleventh Amendment was
adopted solely out of fear that the federal courts would exercise jurisdiction
over states. See Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce
Clause and the ConstitutionalBalance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 596
n.146. The adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment after the Civil War further
extended federaljurisdiction. See LEWIS MAYERS, THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
9 (rev. ed. 1964). State courts, however, still process the vast majority of criminal litigation. HOWARD BALL, CouRTs AND PoLITIcs: THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
SYSTEM 57 (2d ed. 1987). Consequently, the relationship between the state and
federal court systems "reflects the impact and continued vital presence of federalism." Id. at 56.
12. Chief Justice Marshall coined the term "police power" to designate the
broad legislative powers of the states in our federal system. See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 443 (1827); RUTH L. ROETTINGER, THE SUPREME
COURT AND STATE POLICE POWER: A STUDY IN FEDERALISM 10 (1957). Police
power has been defined as the authority of states to "adopt such laws and regulations as tend to prevent the commission of fraud and crime, and secure generally the comfort, safety, morals, health, and prosperity of its citizens by
preserving the public order." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1156 (6th ed. 1990). For
a discussion of the personal and property interests protected by the police
power, see generally Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARv. L.
REv. 1 (1934).

Decentralized law enforcement originated in colonial America when moral
rules were enforced through informal means of social control such as "mocking
criticism." Lawrence M. Friedman, Notes Toward a History of American Justice, in AmERiCAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 13, 14-16 (Lawrence M.
Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1988). See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDTAN, CRNIE AND PuNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1993) (discussing the development of American law enforcement).
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the state and federal court systems. Part III surveys possible
approaches to halting unchecked federalization of criminal law.
This Note concludes by recommending that Congress create a
commission to curb this disturbing trend.
I. FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
A.

EARLY FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW

For constitutional1 3 and political 14 reasons, the federal government possessed extremely limited criminal authority prior to
the Civil War. 15 The 1872 recodification of the Postal Act 16 was
the first statute to extend federal authority beyond protecting
the operations of the national government.' 7 The Supreme
Court, however, resisted further expansion of federal criminal
law throughout the nineteenth century.' 8

B. THE

COMMERCE CLAUSE: FROM WICKARDJ TO PEpZ

Congress's recent propensity for federalizing local crime
originated in the Supreme Court's commerce-power decisions of
the early 1940s. 19 Because the Court's attitude toward economic
13. In the early 1800s the Supreme Court limited federal law enforcement
by rejecting the notion of a federal common law jurisdiction over crimes. See
United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32-34 (1812);
United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415, 415-16 (1816) (upholding
Hudson & Goodwin); see also supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional limitations on federal criminal authority).
14. The political influence of congressional states' rights advocates prior to
the Civil War prevented the federal government from expanding its authority
over local crime. See John S. Baker, NationalizingCriminalLaw: Does Organized Crime Make It Necessary or Proper?,16 RuTGERS L.J. 495, 505-08 (1985).
15. See L.B. Schwartz, FederalCriminalJurisdictionand Prosecutors'Discretion, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 64, 65 (1948) (noting that "[n]ot until after
the Civil War did the federal criminal law make its first substantial ventures
beyond the punishment of acts directly injurious to the central government");
see also DwIGHT F. HENDERSON, CONGRESS, CouRTs, AND CRimiNALs: THE DE.
VELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, 1801-1829, at 1-219 (1985) (discussing

the development of federal criminal law during the first half of the nineteenth
century).
16. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, 17 Stat. 283, 302, 323 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 334, 336, 338 (1940)).
17. See Roger J. Miner, Federal Courts, Federal Crimes, and Federalism,
10 HARv. J.L. & PuB. Poi'y 117, 120 (1987).
18. See, e.g., In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 91-99 (1879) (holding
that Congress does not have authority to punish counterfeiting of trademarks);
United States v. DeWitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41, 45 (1869) (holding that the federal government does not have general police powers).
19. Miner, supra note 17, at 123 (observing that the New Deal decisions set
the stage "for the most expansive intervention of the federal government in
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regulation shifted during this period, 20 the Commerce Clause
became a primary
basis for congressional authority in the area
21
of criminal law.
The New Deal decision that most influenced the future of
federal criminal law was Wickard v. Filburn.2 2 In upholding 23a
statute regulating wheat produced for personal consumption,
the Wickard Court articulated the principle that controls commerce-power analysis to the present day: Congress has the
power to regulate acts that in the aggregate affect interstate
commerce. 2 4 The "affecting commerce" rationale 25 has been the
constitutional justification for expansive civil rights 2 6 and envicrime control since the beginning of the Republic"). Two of these cases are
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 121 (1942) (holding that
the commerce power permits federal regulation of intrastate milk sales that
affect interstate commerce), and United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115
(1941) (holding that congressional motive is irrelevant to a statute's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause).
20. For almost a century prior to the New Deal the Supreme Court had
limited federal regulation by distinguishing between local and national commerce. See supra note 2 (discussing judicial interpretation of the Commerce
Clause). See generally Edward S. Corwin, The Passingof Dual Federalism,36
VA. L. REv. 1 (1950) (analyzing the Court's distinction between types of commerce). The Court, however, shifted its position under political pressure from
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-packing" plan. GERALD GUNTHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 150-52 (10th ed. 1980).
21. See Maloney, supra note 3, at 1796. Prior to this century, the majority
of federal criminal legislation was enacted under the Necessary and Proper
Clause. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W.
Scor, JR., CRImuNAL LAw 118 (2d ed. 1986); Schwartz, supra note 15, at 64-66
(discussing early federal criminal legislation).
22. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
23. In Wickard an Ohio farmer challenged New Deal legislation that controlled fluctuations in wheat prices by limiting the amount each farmer could
introduce to the market. Id. at 115. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938
penalized any farmer whose production exceeded a certain quota. Id. at 113-16.
The Court rejected Filburn's theory that his production had no direct effect on
the market because he consumed the majority of the wheat produced on his
farm. Id. at 127-29. For a detailed account of Wickard, see Robert L. Stern, The
Commerce Clause and the NationalEconomy, 1933-1946: PartTwo, 59 HARv.
L. REV. 883, 901-09 (1946).
24. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29; see also JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 115 (4th ed. 1991) (discussing Wickard's continuing vitality).
25. The Supreme Court has said that the term "affecting commerce" represents "the fullest jurisdictionalbreadth constitutionally permissible under the
Commerce Clause." NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963)
(per curiam).
26. The civil rights cases of the 1960s refined the principle that intrastate
activities can be regarded as having an effect on interstate commerce and thus
subjected to federal regulation. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
303-05 (1964) (accepting Congress's determination that racial discrimination
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ronmental legislation. 27 Under this test congressional power
under the2 8 Commerce Clause has emerged as virtually
unlimited.
Until 1971, the Court restrained the application of the
"affecting commerce" doctrine in criminal cases by requiring
all offenses prosecuted under commerce-based statutes to
have a nexus to interstate commerce. 29 In Perez v. United
by restaurants adversely affects interstate commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964) (upholding application of the
Civil Rights Act because Congress rationally determined that discrimination by
public inns discouraged interstate travel). See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 24, at 163-65 (discussing the importance ofthe commerce power as a
weapon against racial discrimination).
27. In Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1980), the Supreme Court upheld a
federal statute establishing special requirements for coal mining operations
conducted on farmland. Justice Thurgood Marshall's majority opinion held that
protection of farmland falls within the commerce power because of congressional concern about losses in agricultural productivity attributable to mining.
Id. at 324-26.
28. The Commerce Clause now "forms the broadest base of Congressional
power." Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 450 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1070 (1990); see also Vincent A. Cirillo & Jay W. Eisenhofer, Reflections on
the CongressionalCommerce Power, 60 TsmP. L.Q. 901, 914 (1987) ("Congress
could now use the commerce power to legislate for virtually any reasonhealth, morals, or general welfare."). Of course, Congress is not required to
exercise the commerce power. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 11, at 570.
The commerce power's breadth is demonstrated by the fact that since the
New Deal, only one commerce-based statute has been held unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court, and the Court later reversed that holding. See National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Nevertheless, the Court
maintains that the Commerce Clause limits congressional power to regulate
intrastate activity. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 310 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("iltwould be a mistake to conclude that Congress' power to regulate pursuant to the Commerce
Clause is unlimited."); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 198 (1968) ("This Court
has examined and will continue to examine federal statutes to determine
whether there is a rational basis for regarding them as regulations of commerce
among the States.").
29. E.g., Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 346 (1903) (holding Congressional
power under the Commerce Clause does not reach commerce "which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect
other States"). Historically, the Supreme Court permitted commerce-based
statutes targeting criminal conduct in connection with movement across a state
line. See, e.g., Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320-23 (1913) (upholding
the Mann Act's prohibition of the interstate transportation of women for prostitution); Lottery Case, 188 U.S. at 354 (upholding a federal statute prohibiting
interstate transportation of lottery tickets); see also NoRmAN ABRAMS, FEDERAL
CRIMiNAL LAw AND iTs ENFORCEMENT 32-36 (1986) (discussing federal jurisdiction over transportation in interstate commerce). The Court continued to rely
on the direct use of the "interstate channels" rationale articulated in Lottery
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States,3 0 however, the Court upheld a conviction under a federal
loan-shark statute without any showing of a specific interstate
nexus because Congress determined that extortionate credit
transactions in the aggregate affect interstate commerce. 3 1 Consequently, courts now review federal criminal statutes under the
same lenient test used to analyze the validity of other Commerce
32
Clause legislation.

C.

FEDERALIZATION ExPLoSION

Over the last two decades Congress has transformed federal
law enforcement by enacting a determinate sentencing
scheme,3 3 mandatory sentencing statutes, 3 4 and criminal statCase and Hoke in the post-New Deal era. See, e.g., United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 446 (1953) (holding a federal indictment defective
because the government failed to allege that the defendant purchased the devices in interstate commerce).
30. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
31. Id. at 154. The convicted loan shark had used threats to collect money
owed him by a local butcher. Id. at 148. Although the Court acknowledged that
these threats did not by themselves impact interstate commerce, the eightmember majority concluded that Congress reasonably found loan sharking affects interstate commerce because its proceeds can be used to finance interstate
crime. Id. at 154.
The Perez Court relied on Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), and other cases on which the "affecting commerce"
rationale is built. 402 U.S. at 150-54; see also supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text (discussing the "affecting commerce" rationale). Only Justice Potter
Stewart dissented from Perez:
[Ilt is not enough to say that loan sharking is a national problem, for
all crime is a national problem. It is not enough to say that some loan
sharking has interstate characteristics, for any crime may have an interstate setting. And the circumstance that loan sharking has an adverse impact on interstate commerce is not a distinguishing attribute,
for interstate business suffers from almost all criminal activity, be it
shoplifting or violence in the streets.
402 U.S. at 157-58 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
The Perez Court's conclusion that the Commerce Clause does not require
any specific connection between the criminal transaction and interstate commerce has aroused substantial debate. Compare Patricia A. Hair, Note, National Police Power Justified by Economic Impact of Organized Crime, 46 TuL.
L. Rav. 829, 835-36 (1972) (arguing the outcome of Perez is necessary to combat
organized crime) with Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited-The
Federalizationof Intrastate Crime, 15 ARIz. L. REv. 271, 276-85 (1973) (arguing
Perez extends the "affecting commerce" rationale too far).
32. See NowAx & ROTUNDA, supra note 24, at 165.
33. Growing dissatisfaction with the disparities and uncertainties of the
existing sentencing scheme led to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C.). See generally Ronald F.
Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats,and the Administrative Law Perspective on
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utes that essentially duplicate state codes.3 5 Although these developments are interrelated,3 6 the expansion of the federal
the FederalSentencing Commission, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1, 8-16 (1991) (discussing
Congress's desire to remove politics from the sentencing process). The Act restructured federal sentencing by severely limiting judicial sentencing discretion
and abolishing parole so that all prisoners are sentenced to determinate terms.
See Julie Gyurci, Note, ProsecutorialDiscretion to Bring a SubstantialAssistance Motion Pursuantto a Plea Agreement: Enforcing a Good FaithStandard,
78 MNN. L. REV. 1253, 1256-57 (1994) (describing how the guidelines are applied). See generally Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HoFSTmA L. REV. 1 (1988) (discussing the origins of the guidelines).
The congressionally created United States Sentencing Commission now determines federal sentencing policy through the promulgation of binding guidelines. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b), 994(a)(1)-(2) (1988). Federal judges must follow the
guidelines when sentencing convicted criminals if there is no justification for
departing from the prescribed sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
The success of these reforms has been debated extensively. Compare Theresa W. Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the FederalSentencing GuidelinesMeeting
Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J.
393, 444 (1991) (contending the guidelines "generally are meeting their goal of
reducing" sentencing disparity) with Daniel J. Freed, FederalSentencing in the
Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentences, 101
YALE L.J. 1681, 1718-27 (1992) (contending the guidelines are too rigid to
achieve their goals).
34. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 622 (1988) (providing a mandatory one-year sentence for bribing a meat inspector); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1988) (providing a
mandatory minimum ten-year prison term for possession of at least one kilogram of certain controlled substances). The more than 100 mandatory minimum penalty provisions located in 60 different criminal statutes accounted for
60,000 federal sentences between 1984 and 1990. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
MANDATORY MINmIuM

PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 10,

13 (1991).
The major mandatory sentence laws have been enacted by Congress during
election years in response to constituent concerns. Gary T. Lowenthal,
Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate
Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REv. 61, 64 n.9 (1993).
Determinate sentencing and mandatory sentencing statutes are not always
easily reconciled. The sentencing guidelines are intended to provide consistent
punishment for similar crimes and direct judges to a whole complex of factors.
See U.S. SENTENCING COmM'N, supra, at 16; supra note 33 and accompanying
text (discussing guidelines). In contrast, mandatory sentencing emphasizes the
presence of a single aggravating factor, which may result in discriminatory enforcement against African-Americans. See Lowenthal, supra, at 65-66, 122.
35. See Susan N. Herman, Double JeopardyAll Over Again: Dual Sovereignty, Rodney King, and the ACLU, 41 UCLA L. Rxv. 609, 629 (1994) (noting
the "increasingly substantial overlap between state and federal crime"). See
generally Alan N. Greenspan, Note, The ConstitutionalExercise of the Federal
Police Power: A FunctionalApproach to Federalism, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1019,
1021 (1988) (discussing the increasing number of commerce-based criminal
statutes).
36. See infra notes 144-147 and accompanying text (discussing how strict
federal sentences draw cases into the federal system).
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criminal code is the most significant because it blurs the traditional division of prosecutorial authority between state and federal governments. 3 7 Freed by Perez from the fetters of the
Commerce Clause, 38 Congress has increasingly federalized crim-

historically regarded as within the doinal offenses that were
39
states.
the
of
main
Until the early 1970s federalism concerns made Congress
hesitant to enact commerce-based criminal statutes that
targeted local activities. 40 As a result, earlier federal criminal
statutes tended to target organized crime because its interstate
nature made state prosecution difficult. 4 1 In contrast, post-Pe37. See Camille Kenney, Comment, FederalCriminalJurisdiction:A Case
Against Making Federal Cases, 14 SFToN HALL L. REv. 574, 574-75 (1984).
38. See supra note 31 (discussing the Court's application of the "affecting
commerce" rationale in Perez v. United States). The Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 1970 demonstrates how a congressional declaration that a
class of activities affects interstate commerce provides the constitutional justification for legislation. Congress made the finding that "[flederal control of the
intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the
effective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic." 21 U.S.C. § 801(6)
(1988); see also Miner, supra note 17, at 124 (criticizing federal drug legislation). The 1970 Act and related drug legislation caused federal drug prosecutions to increase by 280% since 1980. See David Masci, Long Arm of Federal
Law Keeps Stretching, ORLANDO SENTINEL Tm., Dec. 6, 1992, at G1.
39. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 43 (Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting disruption of a rodeo); 18 U.S.C. § 2118 (1988) (prohibiting robberies involving controlled substances); 18 U.S.C. § 2317 (1988) (prohibiting the sale or receipt of stolen
livestock); 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988) (prohibiting wrongful disclosure of video
tape rental records); see also 18 U.S.C. § 10 (1988) (providing a title-wide definition of interstate commerce).
40. Congress rarely enacted legislation under the Commerce Clause before
the twentieth century. See Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in ContemporaryComment, 25 MINN. L. REv. 432, 471
(1941). The first important commerce-based criminal statutes were the Lottery
Act, prohibiting the interstate transportation of lottery tickets, and the Mann
Act, prohibiting the interstate movement of women for prostitution. See Miner,
supra note 17, at 122; see also supra note 29 (discussing the Supreme Court
decisions upholding these two statutes). Even after the New Deal, Congress
remained hesitant to expand the federal criminal code beyond prohibiting specific items from commerce. Tracy W. Resch, The Scope of FederalCriminalJurisdiction Under the Commerce Clause, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 805, 805 (1972). In
House debates concerning the loan-sharking statute upheld in Perez, for example, opponents argued that the legislation was merely an attempt by the federal
government to enforce state law. See id. at 814 n.64; see also supra note 31 and
accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's reasoning in Perez).
41. Craig M. Bradley, Racketeeringand the Federalizationof Crime, 22 Am.
CRi. L. REv. 213, 215-25 (1984). Federal criminal legislation targeted organized crime even before Prohibition. Id. Prohibition-era statutes like the
Lindbergh Law attempted to assist state authorities without increasing federal
expenses. See Resch, supra note 40, at 807-10. The next burst of federal activity occurred after the Kefauver Committee attracted national attention to or-
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rez legislation has extended federal criminal jurisdiction to include such local offenses as arson.4 2 One recent proposal would
have made virtually any murder with a firearm a federal offense. 43 The 1994 crime bill continued the trend, creating many
new federal offenses. 44
The recently enacted caijacking statute4 5 exemplifies the
increasing federalization of criminal law. Invoking the Commerce Clause as its constitutional justification, 46 Congress made
armed automobile theft a federal offense less than one month
after the carijacking death of a Maryland resident made national
ganized crime. Id. at 811; Bradley, supra, at 235-42. Robert F. Kennedy
observed in 1960 that "[i]f we do not on a national scale attack organized
criminals with weapons and techniques as effective as their own, they will destroy us." ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THE ENEMY WITHIN 265 (1960).
The growth of federal power under the Commerce Clause in the area of
organized crime remains controversial. Compare Bradley, supra, at 265 (arguing that the threat posed by organized crime does not justify expanding federal
power) with John L. McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) or Its Critics:
Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NoT=E DAms LAw. 55, 199-200 (1970) (arguing that more federal legislation is required to combat organized crime).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1988) (providing federal penalties for the destruction by fire of property used in interstate commerce). See generally John Panneton, FederalizingFires: The Evolving Federal Response to Arson Related
Crimes, 23 AM. Camm. L. REv. 151, 158-74 (1985) (discussing the growth of federal arson jurisdiction).
43. 137 CONG. REC. S8846 (daily ed. June 27, 1991) (proposal to amend the
Violent Crime Control Act of 1991, S. 1241, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)). The
proposal would have required federal courts to hear an additional 12,000 criminal cases annually. Moore, supranote 4, at 1140. The federal judiciary successfully opposed the proposal. See Rehnquist, supra note 5, at 7.
44. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
45. In 1992 Congress criminalized armed car theft, commonly referred to
as caijacking, in one of the provisions of the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-519, 106 Stat. 3384-3401 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). The original caijacking statute
provided:
Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 of this title,
takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received
in interstate commerce or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force or violence or by intimidation, or attempts to
do so, shall(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years
or both ....
18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. V 1993).
46. Legislative history shows that Congress included the transportation
prerequisite to insure that the statute would pass constitutional muster under
the Commerce Clause. United States v. Eskridge, 818 F. Supp. 259, 260-62
(E.D. Wis. 1993).
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headlines. 4 7 Congress then amended the statute to expand its
49
scope 48 with little consideration for its effect on the crime rate,
and even though many states had enacted caijacking legislation
of their own. 50

D. A BACKLASH?

RESISTANCE TO FEDERALIZATION

There are signs that steps are being taken to reassess the
scope of the commerce power.5 1 The Reagan Administration, for
example, published a report attacking Perez.5 2 More recently, a
coalition of thirty national criminal justice organizations released a policy statement calling for a halt to the growing trend
47. Pamela Basu died in 1992 after trying to rescue her two-year-old
daughter from two caijackers. See Ted Gup, A Savage Story, TIME, Sept. 21,
1992, at 55, 55. Ms. Basu became tangled in the seat belt outside her car and
was dragged for almost two miles until she fell away from the car. Id.
48. The original caijacking statute contained the prerequisite for federal
jurisdiction that the carjacker must have possessed a firearm. Some supporters
of the legislation found this jurisdiction restriction too stringent. See, e.g., 138
CONG. REC. S17959-60 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
Consequently, Congress amended the statute in 1994 to make caijacking a federal offense without regard to whether the offense is committed with the use of
a firearm. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, § 60003(a)(14), 108 Stat. 1796.
49. There is no evidence that the federal caijacking statute has prevented
an increase in the number of caijackings. U.S. Anti-CarjackingLaw Gets Little
Use, SACRAMENrO BEE, Jan. 18, 1994, at A6; see also infra notes 75-83 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of federal statutes to reduce the crime
rate).
50. For example, Florida, Indiana, and Mississippi make it a felony to take
a motor vehicle from another person's possession by force or violence. FLA.
STAT. ch. 812.133 (1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-5-2 (Burns 1994); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 97-3-117 (1994).
51. Some commentators have begun to argue for a more restrictive reading
of the Commerce Clause. Professor Richard Epstein, for example, observes that
there is a "powerful tension" between the post-New Deal legacy and the original understanding of the commerce power. Richard Epstein, The Proper Scope
of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REv. 1387, 1454-55 (1987). He argues that
the Commerce Clause "is far narrower in scope than modem courts have held."
Id. at 1455.
52. DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, THE-STATUS OF FEDERALISM IN AMERICA A
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON FEDERALISM (1986) [hereinafter FEDERALISM REPORT]. The FederalismReport contends that over the last 200 years the
states have transformed into "administrative appendages for the national government, their independent political power usurped by... constitutional evolution and political and economic change." Id. at 58. The report attacks criminal
legislation based on the expansive interpretation of the commerce power in Perez. Id. at 27; see supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Perez).

466

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:455

towards federalization of state crimes. 5 3 Other critics of the fed54
eralization trend include Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia, 55 Attorney
56 and Federal Bureau of Investigation DiGeneral Janet Reno,
57
rector Louis Freeh.
58
Most significantly, in the 1993 case UnitedStates v. Lopez
the Fifth Circuit held one part of the Gun-Free School Zones Act
of 199059 unconstitutional 60 and criticized Congress for exercising the commerce power without making a finding of an activity's impact on commerce. 6 1 Lopez is evidence of the increased
willingness of some federal6 2courts to invalidate new commercebased criminal legislation.

53. See 30 Organizations Call for Shift in CriminalJustice Policy, CIM.
Jus. NEwSL. (Pace Publications, Washington, D.C.), July 15, 1993, at 3, 3-4.
The coalition contained an unusual mix of liberal and conservative organizations, including the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the
American Correctional Association. Id.
54. See William H. Rehnquist, Welcoming Remarks: National Conference
on State-Federal Judicial Relationships, 78 VA. L. REv. 1657, 1660 (1992)
("Although legislative efforts are necessary in some areas, simple congressional
self-restraint is called for in others, specifically, the federalization of crimes
55. See Nancy E. Roman, Justices Hammer Needless Laws, WASH. TM s,
Feb. 19, 1992, at A4.
56. See Naftali Bendavid, How Much More Can Courts, PrisonsTake?: It's
Tempting to Federalize Crimes, But Opponents are GatheringMomentum, LAw
TIMEs, June 7, 1993, at 1, 22.
57. See FBIDirectorSees Danger of Overload, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 9, 1993, at
32.
58. 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 9 F.3d 105 (5th Cir. 1993), cert.
granted,114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994). For a detailed discussion of Lopez see Debra L.
Farmer, United States v. Lopez: The Fifth CircuitDeclares the Gun-FreeSchool
Zones Act of 1990 an UnconstitutionalExtension of CongressionalPower Under
the Commerce Clause, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1674 (1994).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(i)(A) (Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting possession of a firearm in a school zone).
60. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1367-68.
61. Id. at 1359 (observing "the noticeable absence of any attempt by Congress to link the Gun-Free School Zones Act to commerce").
62. See, e.g., United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242, 245 (M.D. Tenn.
1993) (holding that the commerce power does not permit Congress to regulate
caijackings), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Osteen, 30 F.3d 135 (6th Cir.
1994) (table); see also Constance Johnson, Law and Disorder, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Mar. 28, 1994, at 35, 36 (noting that "federal judges have begun
throwing out prosecutions under several of the criminal laws recently passed by
Congress"); infra notes 124-130 and accompanying text (discussing why federal
courts are hostile to new criminal statutes).
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THE IMPACT OF FEDERALIZATION ON CRIME
AND THE COURTS

Expanding federal authority into traditionally local areas of
law enforcement holds tremendous political appeal for Congress. 63 These political considerations, however, are outweighed
by the negative implications of federalizing criminal law. In the
name of protecting interstate commerce, Congress is raising law
enforcement costs without lowering the crime rate, and is diminishing the effectiveness of the federal courts.
A. A

FAILED CRIME CONTROL STRATEGY

Federalization advocates assert that federal prosecution of
intrastate crime helps overwhelmed local authorities. 6 4 This argument is not compelling because there is no evidence that increasing the federal role in law enforcement lowers the crime
rate. 6 5 Three factors explain this failure: inconsistent enforcement of federal criminal statutes, dilution of law enforcement
resources, and stifling of innovative anti-crime approaches.
1. No Strict Enforcement
Congress embraced deterrence as the primary purpose of
the criminal justice system when it created the United States
Sentencing Commission.6 6 Unfortunately, the proliferation of
federal criminal statutes sabotages this goal. The deterrent effect of criminal statutes depends on their consistent application.6 7 The number of federal investigators and prosecutors,
63. See, e.g., Bendavid, supra note 56, at 1 (describing Congress's "eagerness to respond to headlines" by creating new federal offenses); Is CrimeKilling
America?, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP. DEBATE SERIES, Mar. 15, 1994, at 3, 3
("'Every two years, right before an election, Congress seems to pass a crime
bill.'") (statement of Steven V. Roberts); Moore, supra note 4, at 1140 ("Most
Members of Congress love voting for these [crime] bills. Nobody wants to be
tagged as soft on crime.").
64. See Masci, supra note 38, at G1. Some advocates, for example, compare
current federal criminal legislation to regulations enacted by Congress at the
turn of this century to combat the social problems of child labor and sweatshops. Id.
65. Id. According to the Office of Management and Budget, the national
crime rate dropped slightly during the 1980s, but there is no evidence that the
increasing federal role in law enforcement was the cause. See id.; see also Barrett, supra note 6, at A10 (discussing the ineffectiveness of federal "war" on
drugs).
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (1988); see also supra note 33 (discussing
the Sentencing Commission's creation).
67. See CHARLEs W. THoMAs & DONNA M. BisHop, CRnmAL LAW: UNDERSTANDING BAsIC PRINCrPLES 80 (1987); see also LAFAVE & Scow, supra note 21,
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however, has failed to keep pace with the expanding criminal
code. 68 As a result, criminal statutes are applied inconsistently6 9 and federal prosecutors are prevented from handling
new cases.70 Some commentators estimate that prosecutors
71
pursue at most ten percent of federal crimes.
Furthermore, because federal prosecution practices vary nationwide, these crimes are not uniformly prosecuted.7 2 For instance, the likelihood that a caijacking case will be heard in
73
federal court depends greatly on where the crime occurred.
The underenforcement of federal criminal statutes is particularly acute in densely populated areas.7 4
2. Two Systems Not Better Than One
Historically, federal criminal law targeted interstate crimi75
nal activities while states were responsible for local crime.
at 25 (noting that certainty of punishment may be more important to general
deterrence than severity of sanction).
68. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, for example, used only 13 agents
in 1993 to investigate 290 caijackings. See Johnson, supra note 62, at 36; see
also Unloading After Leaving, RECORDER, Feb. 24, 1994, at 9 (quoting former
Deputy Attorney General Philip Heyman's concerns about the shortage of federal investigators and prosecutors).
69. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of ProsecutorialPower, 94
HARv. L. REV. 1521, 1525 (1981) (observing that "prosecutors increasingly have
been forced to allocate resources by deciding whether to charge").
70. See Laura Frank & Sam V. Meddis, U.S. Attorneys Don't Treat Laws
the Same, USA TODAY, June 22, 1994, at IA. The number of cases referred to
United States Attorneys, for example, has increased 39% in the last 14 years
while the number of cases acted on increased only 21%. Id.
71. See Laura Frank & Sam V. Meddis, Avalanche of FederalLaws Burying the System, USA TODAY, June 22, 1994, at 7A.
72. Id. (comparing acceptance of "almost any" caijacking case in the U.S.
Attorney's office in Tyler, Texas, with "relatively few" caijacking cases in Fort
Worth, Texas).
73. Id.; see also Johnson, supra note 62, at 36 (noting that fewer than 300
people have been prosecuted since the federal caijacking statute's passage).
Studies also indicate that the likelihood of prosecution depends on the characteristics of the potential defendant. See Note, Race and the CriminalProcess,
101 HARV. L. REv. 1472, 1520 (1988). Prosecutors are more likely to pursue
cases involving minority defendants. Id.
74. See Frank & Meddis, supra note 70, at 1A. In 1992, for example, there
were fewer than 10 federal prosecutors for every one million people in the country's six most urban areas. See Managing the FederalGovernment: A Decade of
Decline: A Majority Staff Report to the Committee on Government Operations,
H. 402-1, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 217 (1992). In contrast, Charleston, West Virginia, a rural community, had 20 federal prosecutors for every one million residents. Id.
75. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional
law enforcement roles of the federal government and the states).
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The federalization trend, however, blurs this division of authority and makes law enforcement less efficient. 7 6 Federal and local prosecutors, for example, now vie over whether state or
federal courts will first hear criminal charges. 7 7 In addition, the
increased federal role encourages some state and local governand shift their resources
ments to rely on federal prosecution
78
enforcement.
law
from
away
Perhaps most importantly, federalization dilutes the resources of federal law enforcement agencies. 7 9 Interstate criminal activity, the earlier focus of federal law enforcement,8 0 is
now often ignored as federal prosecutors devote their time and
resources to local crimes.8 ' "Operation Triggerlock," for example, directed federal prosecutors to enforce various firearm violaare
tions in federal courts. 82 As a result, federal prosecutors
83
prevented from focusing on complex white-collar offenses.
3.

One Size Does Not Fit All

Finally, expanding the federal criminal code fails to reduce
the crime rate because Congress is unable to tailor its approach
to local circumstances. The national uniformity federal legislation provides is generally neither necessary nor beneficial in the
area of criminal law.8 4 The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 199085
76. See Barry Weisberg, Injustices at Justice: New A.G. Will Have Hands

Full, PA. L.J., Jan. 18, 1993, at 2, 10.
77. See, e.g., Richard J. Meislin, ProsecutorsVie Over Trial Dates in Scandal Case, N.Y. Tiars, June 12, 1986, at B2 (describing the lack of cooperation
between the United States Attorney in Manhattan and the Manhattan District
Attorney in municipal corruption trial).
78. See Masci, supra note 38, at G1.
79. Frank & Meddis, supra note 71, at 7A (noting that as the number of
crimes deemed "federal" increases, the number of resources dedicated to complex offenses such as tax and environmental crimes dwindles).
80. See supra note 41 (discussing federal organized crime legislation).
81. See Weisberg, supra note 76, at 2, 10.
82. Michael deCourcy Hinds, Bush Aides Push State Gun Cases into U.S.

Courts, N.Y. Tmns, May 17, 1991, at Al; see also Jack H. McCall, Jr., The Emperor'sNew Clothes: Due Process ConsiderationsUnder the Federal Sentencing

Guidelines, 60 TtNN. L. Ray. 467, 522-23 (1993) (criticizing the Bush Administration's Triggerlock initiative).
83. See Joe D. Whitley, Selective Enforcement, RECORnER, Sept. 30, 1993, at
6.
84. Uniformity is less important in criminal law than commercial law, for
example, because there is no need for a comprehensive code to facilitate interstate transactions. See LAFAvE & Scour, supra note 21, at 4.
85. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a),
922(q), 924(a)); see also supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing

the Lopez court's holding that the statute is unconstitutional).
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is an example of a federal criminal statute inappropriate for
many areas of the country. Firearm restrictions necessary 8in6
New York, for example, may not be appropriate in Montana.
law enforcement are a hallmark of
Indeed, diverse approaches to
87
decentralized crime control.
Governors 8 8 and state court chief justices8 9 properly criticize the loss of self-government caused by federalization of criminal law.9 0 Tailoring criminal law to local circumstances
maximizes agreement on law enforcement policies. 91 Moreover,
state and local prosecutors and judges are more closely attuned
of fairness than are their federal
to local standards
92
counterparts.

86. David B. Kopel, On the Firing Line: Clinton's Crime Bill, HERITAGE
FOuND. REP., Sept. 24, 1993, available in LEXIS, Exec Library, Hfrpts file.
87. See Miner, supra note 17, at 127; see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S.
Ct. 2680, 2699 (1991) (noting that policy diversity is "the very raison d'etre of
our federal system").
One example of these diverse approaches is in the area of gambling. The
regulation of gambling falls within the traditional police power of states, and
the federal government has generally allowed states to formulate their own policies. Ronald J. Rychlak, Video Gambling Devices, 37 UCLA L. REV. 555, 578
(1990). Only Hawaii and Utah completely ban gambling activities. Jeffery C.
Hallam, Comment, Rolling the Dice: Should Intoxicated Gamblers Recover
Their Losses?, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 240, 240 n.3 (1990). The restrictions on gambling in the other 48 states vary considerably. North Dakota and Montana, for
example, are adjacent states with different restrictions on lotteries. Compare
Montana State Lottery Act of 1985, MoNT. CODE ANN. § 23-7-101 to -110 (1993)
(establishing a state lottery) with N.D. CoNST. art. XI, § 25 (prohibiting all
lotteries).
88. George Embrey, Governors Want More Help, Fewer Restraints from
Washington, CoLUmBus DISPATCH, July 17, 1994, at 3B (discussing governors'
concerns that federalization hampers state law enforcement).
89. See, e.g., Bill Rankin, State Justices Pan Federal Crime Bill, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., Feb. 11, 1994, at C2 (describing a resolution by state chief justices
criticizing federalization).
90. See Miner, supra note 17, at 127 (contending that the citizenry has
been "conditioned" to turn to federal law enforcement "as the first line of defense against anti-social conduct").
91. Robert D. Raven, Don't Wage War on Crime in Federal Courts, TEx.
LAw., Aug. 31, 1992, at 12, 12.
92. See Bruce Fein, In Law Enforcement Waltz States, Locals Ought Lead,
N.J. L.J., June 6, 1991, at 19, 19.
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B. FEDERAL COURTS BECOME POLICE COURTS
A caseload crisis confronts the federal civil justice system. 9 3
A growing case backlog 94 is forcing potential litigants to suffer
substantial delays.9 5 In 1989, for example, the median disposition of federal civil cases was a year and a half.9 6 Federal civil
cases routinely take over two and a half years to reach trial.9 7
After observing this disturbing trend from the bench, Judge Irving Kaufman noted:
In its third century, the federal court system has entered a period of
crisis. Faced with ever-burgeoning caseloads and essentially static resources, the nation's courts fall further and further behind the promise
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "the just, speedy, and inexpen98
sive determination of every action."

Congress's recent penchant for federalizing intrastate crime
is the principal cause of this crisis in the civil justice system. 99
As Justice O'Connor observed, federalization has had a "sea
change" effect on the federal judiciary.1 0 0 For a number of reasons, the growing criminal docket is turning federal courts into
police courts.' 0 '
93. See generally Nancy Levit, The CaseloadConundrum, Constitutional
Restraint and the Manipulationof Jurisdiction,64 NOT=E DAME L. REV. 321,
323-27 (1989) (discussing the burgeoning federal docket).
94. Civil case backlog refers to those cases pending in district court more
than one year after being filed. Patrick Johnston, Civil Justice Reform: Juggling Between Politics and Perfection, 62 FoRDHAM L. REV. 833, 856 n.135
(1994). The Connecticut federal court system, for example, has a 4,055 civil
case backlog. Massive Court Backlog, NAT'L L.J., June 6, 1994, at A8, A8.
Federal appellate courts also suffer from ever-increasing caseloads.
Carolyn D. King, A Matter of Conscience, 28 Hous. L. REv. 955, 955-57 (1991);
see also Jaret Seiberg, Court Vacancies Result in Longer Case Dispositions,
CONN. L. Tm., May 9, 1994, at 8, 8 (noting that in 1993 the Second Circuit
required an average of almost six months to dispose of a case).
95. See Joseph T. McLaughlin & Karen M. Crupi, ADR Agreements Enforceable When Intent, Limits Are Clear, N.Y. L.J., July 19, 1993, at S-5, S-5.
96. Irving R. Kaufman, Reform for a System in Crisis: Alternative Dispute
Resolution in the Federal Courts, 59 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1989).
97. Id. at 2.
98. Id. at 1 (quoting FED. R. Cirv. P. 1).
99. United States v. Mosquera, 813 F. Supp. 962, 965 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
100. Steve Albert, O'Connor: CapitalHabeas Corpus ProcessHas Been Improved, RECORDER, Aug. 20, 1993, at 2 (quoting Justice O'Connor's speech

before the Ninth Circuit's annual conference).
101. Rehnquist, supra note 5, at 7 ("Continuation of the current trend toward large-scale federalization of the criminal law has the enormous potential
of changing the character of the federal judiciary.").
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1. Criminal Case Filings
Criminal filings traditionally did not constitute a major jurisdictional area of the federal courts. 10 2 Federal courts instead
reserved their time for the civil cases that shaped the nation's
commercial development.' 0 3 The federal criminal docket, however, has increased by seventy percent since 1980 while the
number of judges has remained relatively static.' 0 4 As a result,
73.6 new criminal cases are filed annually for each authorized
judgeship as opposed to the 54.2 new cases filed annually fourteen years ago. 10 5 Authorization for a large number of federal
increasing criminal caseload is unlikely in
judges to handle10the
6
the near future.
2. The Speedy Trial Act
The Speedy Trial Act,10 7 enacted to enforce the Sixth
Amendment, 0 8 operates in conjunction with the growing crimi102. BALL, supra note 11, at 98.
103. One commentator notes:
We must decide whether we want the federal courts to spend the majority of their time hearing general criminal cases or whether we want
the federal courts to occupy their traditional role as a forum for civil
disputes on nationally important issues such as commerce, constitutional questions, civil rights and civil liberties.
Raven, supra note 91, at 12. See generally Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the
Allocation of FederalBusiness Between State and FederalCourts: FederalJurisdictionand "The MartianChronicles", 78 VA. L. REv. 1769, 1787-1831 (1992)

(analyzing traditional types of federal jurisdiction).

104. Patrick E. Longan, The Shot Clock Comes to Trial: Time Limits For
FederalCivil Trials, 35 ARiz. L. REv. 663, 672 (1993). Federal felony criminal

filings increased 40% between 1985 and 1992. See John F. Rooney, Senior

Judges Tote HeavierFederal Caseload,But Courts Still Short, Cm. DAILY L.

BULL., Apr. 12, 1994, at 1. The number of district judges, however, increased

only 11.4% during the 1980s. See Sam Meddis, Court Study Calls for More
Judges, GreaterState Role, USA TODAY, Mar. 30, 1990, at 3A.

105. See Longan, supra note 104, at 672.
106. Andrew Grene, Bauer Supports Limited Growth of FederalBench, CIm.
DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 21, 1993, at 3. Last year the Judicial Conference of the
United States issued a written statement endorsing a small federal judiciary
that would ensure the quality of federal judges and prevent a loss in collegiality. Id.; cf Chief Justice Urges Fast Appointments of Federal Judges, N.Y.

TIMEs, Jan. 2, 1994, at 1, 7 (noting the "serious judicial vacancy problem" that
Chief Justice Rehnquist mentioned in his year-end report on the federal courts).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). For a discussion of the Act's

history, see Jeana P. Hosch, The Speedy TrialAct: Its Effect on Civil Caseloads
and Forum Shopping, 9 AM. J. TRIAL Anvoc. 125, 125-29 (1985).

108. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
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nal docket to divert judicial resources from civil cases. 10 9 The
Act requires federal courts either to try or to dismiss contested
criminal cases within seventy days. 11 0 Moreover, the Act orders
that courts not grant continuances for criminal cases because of
civil congestion."1 ' The Act thus entitles the criminal docket to
priority over civil cases. Consequently, state crimes currently
heard in federal courts take precedence over traditional civil
1 12
litigation.
3.

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines exacerbate federalization's effects on the judiciary. 113 In an attempt to eliminate disparity, 1 14 the guidelines have made the sentencing process
"more complicated and time-consuming than ever."115 Sentencing hearings now consume more judicial time. 1 16 In addition,
the sentencing guidelines facilitate routine appeal and may lead
to more appeals than was previously the case. 117 Finally, because the guidelines effectively robbed prosecutors of their abil-

109. Congress foresaw that the Speedy Trial Act might contribute to the
civil case backlog in the federal courts. See 18 U.S.C. § 3166(b)(9) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). For an analysis of federal court compliance with
the Speedy Trial Act, see generally George S. Bridges, The Speedy Trial Act of
1974: Effects on Delays in FederalCriminalLitigation,73 J. Cmm. L. & CRIunNOLOGY

50 (1982).

111. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(C).
112. Final Report of the Eastern District of New York Advisory Group, 142

F.R.D. 185, 210 (1991).
113. See Edward D. Cavanagh, Unclogging the JudicialPipeline, CoNN. L.
TRIn., Jan. 17, 1994, at 25, 25; see also supra note 33 (discussing the sentencing
guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission).
114. See Susan E. Ellingstad, Note, The Sentencing Guidelines: Downward
DeparturesBased on a Defendant'sExtraordinaryFamilyTies and Responsibilities, 76 MIN. L. REv. 957, 959-60 (1992) (explaining Congress's purpose in
creating the United States Sentencing Commission).
115. FinalReport, 142 F.R.D. at 210.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz-Garcia, 886 F.2d 474,477 (1st Cir. 1989)
("[W]e anticipate that appeals from sentencing decisions will become much
more commonplace."); Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Pleafor Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 906 (1991) (noting
that sentencing review before the guidelines was "almost nonexistent").

474

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:455

ity to plea-bargain, 1 8 more federal prosecutions now go to trial
and thereby drain even more resources. 11 9
III. HALTING UNCHECKED FEDERALIZATION: A
SURVEY OF OPTIONS
The proliferation of federal criminal statutes serves law enforcement poorly and, if left unchanged, will damage the federal
courts. Various solutions are possible. All of the approaches
strive to limit federal involvement in criminal enforcement to
matters of true national concern. As Chief Justice Earl Warren
observed, "It is essential that we achieve a proper jurisdictional
balance between the Federal and State court systems, assigning
to each system those cases most appropriate in the light of the
120
basic principles of federalism."
The separation of powers makes each branch of the federal
government responsible for law enforcement. Consequently,
each branch has the power to restore the balance described by
Chief Justice Warren. The federal courts can limit the authority
of Congress to enact criminal legislation under the Commerce
Clause. Federal prosecutors can refuse to prosecute local
crimes. Both of these approaches, however, have serious drawbacks. The best solution is for Congress to exercise restraint in
enacting criminal legislation. Because congressional restraint is
unlikely, the most attractive and politically realistic approach is
for Congress to create a commission to evaluate commerce-based
criminal statutes.
A. THE COURTS
As one district court noted, the expansion of federal criminal law is possible "only because we in the judicial branch are
willing to interpret the Commerce Clause of the Constitution so
118. See Longan, supra note 104, at 675; see also David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice: Real-Offense Sentencing and the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. Rav. 403, 419 (1993) (noting that "there exists a fundamental
tension between plea bargaining and sentencing guidelines").
119. Approximately 85% of criminal convictions result from guilty pleas.
Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargainingin the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L.
REV. 1471, 1475 n.12 (1993). A recent five percent decrease in guilty pleas has
caused a 33% increase in federal trials. See Raven, supra note 91, at 12. In the
year ending June 30, 1990, for example, criminal trials constituted 44% of all
completed federal trials. See McLaughlin & Crupi, supra note 95, at S-5.
120. Rehnquist, supra note 54, at 1657 (quoting Earl Warren, Address by
the Chief Justice of the United States, 26 A.L.I. PRoc. 27, 33 (1959)).
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broadly." 12 1 If the trend toward federalization continues, however, the Commerce Clause may again become an obstacle to
federal legislation. 122 A substantial segment of the federal
judiciary may decide that congressional authority extends too
123
far into local matters.
There are philosophical and pragmatic reasons why the federal judiciary may be willing to narrow the commerce power.
First, the Reagan Administration, which published a report attacking Perez v. United States124 for undermining federalism, 12 5
appointed an extremely high percentage of the current Article
HI judiciary, 126 including three Supreme Court justices. 127 Almost all Reagan appointees share the former president's policy
preferences in this area. 128 Second, some federal judges are concerned about the high number of criminal cases funneled into
the federal courts. 12 9 As one court stated:
121. United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242, 244 (M.D. Tenn. 1993),
rev'd sub noma. United States v. Osteen, 30 F.3d 135 (6th Cir. 1994) (table).
122. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the earlier requirement that the government demonstrate a nexus between the crime and
interstate commerce).
123. The United States Judicial Conference, the federal judiciary's policymaking organization, for example, has expressed its concerns about federalization and has endorsed "imited federal jurisdiction." Grene, supra note 106, at 3.
124. 402 U.S. 146 (1971); see supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing the Perez Court's reasoning).
125. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
126. By 1989 Reagan appointees constituted 47% of all federaljudges. Sheldon Goldman, Reagan'sJudicialLegacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing
Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318, 318-19 (1989). Goldman believes that "Ronald Reagan
will be seen as having had the greatest influence on the shape of the American
judiciary and law since Franklin Roosevelt." Id. at 330.
127. President Reagan elevated Justice Rehnquist to the position of Chief
Justice and selected Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. THE OxFoRD
COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 971 (Kermit L. Hall
et al. eds., 1992).
128. See William E. Kovacic, Reagan's JudicialAppointees and Antitrust in
the 1990s, 60 FoRDHAi L. Ruv. 49,53 (1991); Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee
Clause as a Basis for Federal Prosecutions of State and Local Officials, 62 S.
CAL. L. REv. 369, 411-15 (1989).
President Bush's district and appeals court appointees were also predominantly conservative. Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary:
Carryingon a Tradition,74 JUDICATURE 294, 296-98 (1991). Consequently, the
Reagan-Bush era produced an "historic transformation of the federal judiciary."
Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The FinalImprint, 76 JUDICATURE
282, 282 (1993).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242, 244 (M.D. Tenn.
1993) (observing that "[a]t every meeting of federal judges that I attend there is
the complaint that the Congress is broadening federal jurisdiction to the point
where we are unable to do our jobs"), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Osteen, 30
F.3d 135 (6th Cir. 1994) (table).
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[Tihis court suspects that Congress expects courts invariably to presume that Congress intends to hang any and all new federal legislation
which purports to control activity within the several states on the soAfter all, has not everyone been condicalled Commerce Clause ....
tioned to believe that there is nothing which moves or has ever moved
which does not support an invocation-of the Commerce Clause .... 130

The Supreme Court has never held that the commerce
power is unlimited and has thus kept open the possibility that
the courts could reevaluate its application. 13 1 Even a minor reevaluation could yield fundamental changes in federal authority. If the courts in criminal cases, for example, were to require
prosecutors to prove the crime had an actual effect on interstate
commerce, federal prosecutions of local crime would be
13 2
curtailed.
Judicial resolution of federalization, however, has serious
detriments. Perez v. United States,13 3 the landmark Supreme
Court decision expanding criminal jurisdiction under the commerce power, is firmly rooted in the "affecting commerce" rationale.'3 A move away from Perez, therefore, could erode the
doctrine and thereby weaken important civil rights and environmental precedents. 135 Moreover, a reevaluation would undercut
established criminal case law and possibly lead federal courts to
reach inconsistent conclusions about the "constitutionality of
criminal statutes. Such inconsistency would confuse the criminal law landscape.
Most importantly, as the Supreme Court observed, interstate commerce "is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one." 13 6 Consequently, as federal courts have recognized,
Congress has a superior institutional capacity for determining
the effect of an activity on interstate commerce. 13 7 Modern jurisprudence, therefore, treats the establishment of a nexus be-

130. United States v. Morrow, 834 F. Supp. 364, 365 (N.D. Ala. 1993).
131. See supra note 28 (discussing how the Supreme Court maintains that
Congress does not have unlimited power to regulate intrastate activity).
132. See Kurland, supra note 128, at 411.
133. 402 U.S. 146 (1971); see supra note 31 (discussing the Perez Court's
reasoning).
134. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
136. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir.) (observing that
committee reports provide Congress with important information), reh'g denied,
9 F.3d 105 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994).
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tween activities and interstate commerce as a question of fact
best left to the legislature.1 3 8

B. THE ExEcUTIvE BRANCH
The effects of federalization could be mitigated through the
discretion of federal prosecutors. United States attorneys are
granted the power to "prosecute... all offenses" 13 9 in their district, but are not obligated to do So.14 0 The decision to institute
criminal charges is the prosecutor's alone to make 14 ' and is
nearly immune from judicial review. 142
This solution would require that federal prosecutors make a
pre-arraignment determination that the alleged offense actually
impacted interstate commerce. This approach would thus be a
de facto return to pre-Perez federal law enforcement: a nexus
with interstate commerce would be required before a local crime
would be heard in federal court. 14 3
Unstructured prosecutorial discretion is unlikely to alleviate the problems of federalization. Criminal cases "tend to flow
toward the jurisdiction with tougher penalties." 144 The strict
sentencing guidelines 145 and harsh mandatory sentences 146 en138. See Saul M. Pilchen, Politics v. The Cloister: Deciding When the
Supreme Court Should Defer to CongressionalFactfinding Underthe Post-Civil
War Amendments, 59 NomE DAME L. REv. 337, 382-85 (1984). This judicial
deference to congressional findings regarding impacts on interstate commerce
contrasts sharply with the de novo judicial determination in early commercepower cases. Id. at 380-81.
139. 28 U.S.C. § 547 (1988). For a discussion of the history and role of
United States Attorneys, see ABRAMs, supra note 29, at 9.
140. See ABRAHAM S. GoLDSTEN, THE PASSrVE JuDictLAY 9 (1981). See generally Charles F.C. Ruff, FederalProsecutionof Local Corruption:A Case Study
in the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. L.J. 1171 (1977) (discussing
the role of federal prosecutors in formulating law enforcement policy).
141. A federal prosecutor, for example, does not have to initiate prosecution
even if sufficient evidence exists to support a conviction. See Jane W. Ellis,
ProsecutorialDiscretion to Charge in Cases of Spousal Assault: A Dialogue, 75
J. CiRi. L. & CImuNoLoGY 56, 60 (1984).
142. See, e.g., Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
("Few subjects are less adapted to judicial review than.., discretion in deciding
when and whether to institute criminal proceedings, or what precise charge
shall be made, or whether to dismiss a proceeding once brought.").
143. See supranotes 40-41 and accompanying text (discussing federal criminal law prior to Perez v. United States).
144. H. Scott Wallace, The Drive to Federalize is a Road to Ruin, CRnmi.
JusT., Fall 1993, at 8, 52 (quoting Rep. Hughes).
145. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
146. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing federal
mandatory sentencing statutes).
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acted by Congress over the past two decades thus draw cases
into the federal system. Two factors explain this phenomenon:
First, law enforcement officials file[ ] cases in federal court which they
previously would have filed in state court because they believe[ I that
the defendants [will] serve more time in prison under the guidelines
than they would under state law. Second, law enforcement officials
file[ I cases in federal court that they previously would not have filed in
either state or federal court, because under pre-guidelines law, they
did not
believe the results of the prosecution would be worth the
14 7
effort.

To help combat this phenomenon, the Department of Justice
could adopt internal guidelines governing the prosecution
of intrastate crime.' 4 8 Federal prosecutors, for example, could be required to obtain the Assistant Attorney General's approval
before initiating prosecution. 14 9 These guidelines, however,
would not be enforceable by the courts' 50 and could be modified
by the Justice Department at any time.' 5 ' Consequently,

prosecutorial discretion does not offer a lasting solution to the
problem of federalization.
147. Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to
Disparity, 28 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 161, 205 (1991); see also United States v. Montague, 29 F.3d 317, 322 (7th Cir. 1994) (describing how federal prosecutors can
obtain more severe sentences for prostitution than state prosecutors); Eric
Schlosser, Marijuanaand the Law, ATLANTIc MoNTHLY, Sept. 1994, at 84, 8889 (describing the differences between state and federal drug penalties).
148. The Department of Justice has issued comprehensive guidelines regarding many areas of prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., Lesley S. Banney, The
Prosecution of Sophisticated Urban Street Gangs: A Proper Application of
RICO, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 579, 593-96 (1993) (discussing the Department of
Justice's guidelines for prosecuting organized crime). See generally Gregory H.
Williams, PoliceDiscretion: The InstitutionalDilemma-Who Is in Charge?, 68
IowA L. REv. 431, 458-59 (1983) (discussing the development of prosecution
guidelines).
149. Such a solution would be similar to the current guidelines requiring
approval of the Assistant Attorney General before indicting attorneys for laundering their clients' fees. See D. Randall Johnson, The Criminally Derived
Property Statute: Constitutionaland Interpretive Issues Raised by 18 U.S.C.
§ 1957, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1291, 1357 (1993); see also Kurland, supra note
128, at 390 n.74 (describing the requirement that federal prosecutors receive
permission before initiating RICO prosecutions).
150. Haley v. United States, 394 F. Supp. 1022, 1027 (W.D. Mo. 1975)
(describing prosecution guidelines as "simply a 'housekeeping provision' of the
Department of Justice").
151. See, e.g., William J. Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BRooK L. REV.
781, 815 n.118 (1988) (discussing how federal prosecution guidelines are simply
the product of litigation strategy); Barry Tarlow, Rico Revisited, 17 GA. L. REv.
291, 298 n.16 (1983) (discussing Department of Justice's disclaimer that prosecution guidelines are merely advisory).
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CONGRESS

The third option for halting federalization is for Congress to
exercise restraint and legislate only when federal action is genuinely necessary. 152 It is Congress's responsibility to limit federal
jurisdiction 153 and thereby maintain the allocation of authority
envisioned by the Framers. 154 Moreover, as Chief Justice Marshall noted, the commerce power is ultimately restrained only by
Congress's discretion.- 5 5
Historically, Congress proceeded cautiously in enacting
criminal statutes that target local activities. 56 The carjacking
statute provides Congress an opportunity to reestablish a policy
of restraint. The statute, by making almost any theft of an automobile a federal offense, 157 intrudes on a traditionally local area
of law enforcement without lowering the crime rate. 158 Congress should therefore limit its scope to criminal activity with an
actual nexus to interstate commerce. The amended statute, for
example, could target theft of an automobile when combined
with the movement of the stolen car or its parts across state
59
lines.'
152. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 959 F.2d 63, 68 (6th Cir. 1992) (observing that curtailing federalization "must come from Congress rather than
the courts").
153. The Constitution provides for "such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Congress also has authority over the Supreme Courts appellate jurisdiction. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2. Congress thus has a great deal of control over the federal
judiciary. See Michael Wells, Congress'sParamountRole in Setting the Scope of
FederalJurisdiction,85 Nw. U. L. Rav. 465, 465 (1991). See generally MAYERs,
supra note 11, at 5-10 (discussing the allocation of federal judicial power).
154. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional
role of states in the area of criminal law).
155. Chief Justice Marshall observed:
The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are
... the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from
...
abuse [of the commerce power]. They are the restraints on which
the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
156. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional
reluctance of Congress to enact criminal legislation).
157. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text (discussing the caijacking statute).
158. See supra note 49.
159. The House Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice, for example,
held a hearing that discussed the relationship between caijackings and chop
shop operations. See Anti-CarTheft Act of 1992: Hearings on H.R. 4542 Before
the Subcomm. on Crime and CriminalJustice of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 27-30 (1991).
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Unfortunately, such an amendment is improbable because
160
Congress has an "underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint."
To be sure, the need for Congress to regain its historical caution
16 1
regarding criminal law is recognized by many members.
With little political mileage to be gained, however, Congress is
unlikely to tackle the politically risky task of limiting the criminal code. Indeed, the reverse situation is more probable: Congress will continue to enact new criminal statutes to appease
constituents.' 6 2 As the Framers feared, the broader national interest is in danger of being subjugated
by the political considera1 63
tions of individual legislators.
D. A PROPOSED COMMISSION
This Note proposes that Congress appoint a commission to
address the politically charged issue of revising the criminal
code. Such a commission would not be without precedent and,
although not a panacea, would be likely to revise the code fairly
while avoiding a purely politically-driven outcome.
1.

The Proposed Commission

The proposed commission takes as its model the 1988 com164
mission used to decide which military bases should be closed.
In that situation, Congress, unable to overcome political
gridlock, authorized a twelve-member commission of military
experts appointed by the Secretary of Defense to recommend
160. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 588 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
161. Senator Joseph Biden, for example, acknowledged in a recent speech
that 'too many small cases... are brought in federal courts, rather than the
state courts that are equally competent to hear them." Bendavid, supra note
56, at 1; see also Members of CongressFault Trend to FederalizeCrimes, THmD
BRANCH (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Wash., D.C.), June 1993, at
1, 1 (describing the concerns of Rep. Brooks and Sen. Metzenbaum).
162. See, e.g., Naftali Bendavid, Will FederalizingDomestic Violence Really
Help Women?, RECORDER, June 21, 1994, at 1, 12-13 (discussing the politics of
the Violence Against Women Act); see also supra note 63 and accompanying
text (discussing the political appeal of expanding the criminal code).
163. See generallyAkhil R. Amar, A Neo-FederalistView ofArticle III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205, 224-25
(1985) (discussing the Framers' concerns about political pressures on
Congress).
164. See Susan F. Rasky, CongressAgrees on ClosingBases But Leaves the
Choice to a Panel, N.Y. Tmms, Oct. 13, 1988, at Al.

1994]

FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW

481

which bases should be closed in light of various criteria. 65 Importantly, the Base Closure and Realignment Act provided for
silent congressional approval of the commission's recommendaCongress to voting on the entire list of bases to
tions and limited
16 6
be closed.
Similarly, the proposed commission would study the federal
criminal code and recommend which statutes targeting intrastate crime are excessive. The charter would provide at least
four criteria for the commission to consider: 1) the historical
role of the federal government in controlling crime, 2) the police
power of states, 3) the mission of the federal court system, and 4)
the deterrence value of particular statutes. 16 7 The proposed
commission would consist of former members of Congress, retired federal law enforcement officials, and scholars appointed
by the Attorney General. The commission's recommendations
would take effect unless Congress passed a joint resolution rejecting the package proposal.
2. Advantages of Commissions
Government by commission is an increasingly common
mechanism used by Congress to take advantage of expert analysis while avoiding legislative stalemate. Commissions similar to
the proposed one, for example, have successfully addressed such
divisive policy issues as the closure of military bases and the
reform of the social security system. 168 Additionally, the United
States Sentencing Commission has been praised by some com165. Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-526, 102 Stat. 2623, 2627 (set out as notes
under 10 U.S.C. § 2687).
166. Limiting congressional acceptance or rejection of a commission's recommendations helps prevent a later Congress from repudiating the commission.
See Mark Tushnet, Principles,Politics, and ConstitutionalLaw, 88 MIcH. L.
REv. 49, 73 (1989). For a discussion of the procedures required by the Base

Closure Act, see Russell J. Bruemmer, Intelligence Community Reorganization:
Declining the Invitation to Struggle, 101 YALE L.J 867, 885-86 (1992).
167. These factors are suggested by the above analysis. See supra part II
(discussing the harms of federalization).
168. The National Commission on Social Security Reform, commonly known
as the Greenspan Commission, was formed by President Reagan to stabilize the
fund. Michael A. Lerner with Jerry Buckley, Saving Social Security, NEws-

WEEK, Sept. 13, 1982, at 41, 41. The 15-member commission, headed by economist Alan Greenspan, produced a bipartisan proposal on social security
adjustments to keep the system solvent. Natalie Hanlon, Military Base Closings: A Study of Government By Commission, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 331, 340-42
(1991).
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mentators for removing politics from the sentencing process.1 6 9
Federal courts have held that these commissions are not an excessive delegation of legislative authority. 170 Consequently,
continue to play an
scholars predict legislative commissions will
17 1
important role in policy decisionmaking.
Federalization resembles policy issues successfully addressed by previous commissions, indicating that the proposed
commission would succeed in its mission. The Greenspan Commission, for example, was formed in the early 1980s to address a
social security system on the verge of bankruptcy. 172 Federalization, by draining federal judicial resources, also requires Congress to undertake meaningful reform. Such comprehensive
because of their ability to
reform is well suited for commissions
173
deliberate in an orderly manner.
The creation of a commission, however, does not guarantee
a halt to federalization of criminal law. Not all commissions
have succeeded in their missions. 17 4 Moreover, the politics of
federalization differ from those of base-closings. Only a few legislators felt pressure to oppose the base-closing commission's
recommendations. 175 In contrast, federal criminal law is a
much broader issue. Nonetheless, federalization is disrupting
law enforcement and damaging the federal courts. The proposed
commission might not succeed, but the possibility of restoring
169. See, e.g., Karle & Sager, supra note 33, at 420 (praising the Commission for reducing sentencing disparity). Unlike the Sentencing Commission,
which is a standing body, see supra note 33, the commission proposed in this
Note would make a single recommendation.
170. E.g., National Federation of Federal Employees v. United States, 905
F.2d 400, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
171. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justificationfor the BureaucraticState, 105 HAxv. L. REV. 1511, 1542 (1992) ("I believe that the success achieved by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission was
not an anomaly.").
172. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing the social-security commission).
173. See Seidenfeld, supra note 171, at 1542. Commissions are often more
deliberative than contemporary Congress because they "recreate ... the informal bargaining mechanism" that existed during the heyday of political parties.
Michael A. Fitts, Can IgnoranceBe Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive
Influence in PoliticalInstitutions, 88 MICH. L. REv. 917, 952-53 (1990). Similarly, commissions provide political cover for congressional members on controversial policy issues. See Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive
Quest for Judicial Review of PoliticalFairness, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1643, 1666
(1993).
174. The Quadrennial Pay Commission, for example, failed to resolve the
politically delicate issue of salary increases for Congress and the federal judiciary. See Hanlon, supra note 168, at 342-43.
175. Id. at 344.
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the traditional federal/state criminal law dichotomy and protecting the federal courts makes it worth the effort.
CONCLUSION
American federalism provides for the vast majority of
crimes to be regulated by state and local governments. Congress, however, has enacted numerous statutes in recent years
creating new federal offenses based on expansive interpretations
of the commerce power. By creating the commission proposed in
this Note, Congress can send the strong message that it intends
to restore the proper balance between state and federal law
enforcement.

